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Abstract
Blockchain technologies offer new open sourcebased opportunities for developing new types of digital
platforms and services. While research on the topic is
emerging, it has this far been predominantly focused to
technical and legal issues. To broaden our
understanding of blockchain technology based services
and platforms, we build on earlier literature on
payments and payment platforms and propose a
research agenda divided into three focal areas of 1)
organizational issues; 2) issues related to the
competitive environment; and 3) technology design
issues. We discuss several salient themes within each
of these areas, and derive a set of research question for
each theme, highlighting the need to address both risks
and opportunities for users, as well as different types
of stakeholder organizations. With this research
agenda, we contribute to the discussion on future
avenues for Information Systems research on
blockchain technology based platforms and services.

1. Introduction
Blockchain technologies are touted as one of the
most significant technical innovations in digitalization
of asset ownership1. Blockchain has been demonstrated
to be a versatile programmable platform for managing
contracts and ownership and providing an audit trail
that cannot be easily tampered with, but can be
distributed in real time [1]. Pervasive market
penetration of novel cloud-connected mobile devices including wearables - in combination with cloud-based
data storage and analytics enable new types of
distributed payment and transaction platforms that can
be built as an overlay on top of traditional financial
services and banking systems. In extreme cases – as

with distributed cryptocurrencies – not even a trusted
third party such as a central bank is required.
These novel transaction and payment platforms
allow for the development of a range of innovative
financial instruments, such as micro-payments, peer-topeer lending or non-regulated money enabling banking
for the about 2.5 billion “non-banking” population2,
while at the same time they can potentially simplify
and lower the cost of transactions for example in crossborder payments 3. Any digital representation of
money is relative to the underlying computing
technology and the digital payments we have seen so
far have reflected a transactional computing model of
manipulating rather stable entities. Thus, the current
transformation is related to “money” and “cash”
adapting to the decentralized nature of computing,
which allow for different industrial and societal trust
arrangements, for example distributed peerless and
anonymous international money transfer services and
even marriages4 based on smart contracts.
These decentralized platforms offer new
possibilities for anonymity, as they offer a vision of
anonymous digital currencies, which can be a bit
exaggerated. At the same time, these platforms also
challenge the existing identity management systems
and suggest new ones. To better understand these
opportunities and challenges, research on mitigating
risks and leveraging opportunities of digitalization and
decentralization of payment platforms enabled by
blockchain technologies is clearly called for. We also
need deeper theoretical understanding of both how
these platforms and services are designed, developed
and organized, as well what is acceptable for users and
how they perceive trust in the digital and decentralized
world.
So far, the studies on the fairly recently introduced
blockchain technology have predominantly focused on
2
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technology issues; aimed at addressing different
technical challenges that such distributed systems pose
[2, 3]. Another main research area has been the legal
frameworks and their applicability (see e.g. [4, 5]).
Now as the number of users of services based is
increasing, more research on payment and asset
management systems and service platforms in the
disciplines of Information Systems and Management is
called for [6, 7].
In what follows we first review the key literature
that has addressed blockchain technology so far. We
also provide a review on the essential literature on
digitization of payments and payment platforms as the
primary context for utilization of blockchain
technologies. We will then identify a research gap by
pinpointing where our understanding is still
underdeveloped.
As our main contribution, we outline a more
holistic research agenda for studying the development
and utilization of blockchain technology, with
particular emphasis on digital payments and payment
platforms. Furthermore, we suggest possible research
problem areas and derived research questions for IS
researchers to seek answers to.

2. Literature review
In this section, we will begin by providing an
introduction to blockchain technology including
definitions, after which we will discuss the growing
body of literature on the first serious application of it,
Bitcoin cryptocurrency. We will then provide a brief
overview of the earlier literature on the broader context
of payments and payment platforms, and conclude with
a summary of the identified research gaps. For the
purposes of this paper, the literature review presented
is intentionally concise, while number of systematic
literature reviews can be found on various areas of
digital payments (see e.g. [8]).

2.1. Key definitions
Digital payments are simply payments that are
conducted through digital means, for example as near
field communication transactions between electronic
wallet and a cash register, or through digital money [9].
Consequently digital platform is “a proprietary or open
modular layered technological architecture that
support efficient development of innovative derivatives,
which are embedded in a business or social
context.”[10] Blockchain can be seen as one such
platform.
Blockchain technology is a sequential distributed
database where the entire earlier transaction history is
stored and shared in a (block) chain in a public ledger

[6].
Blockchains
are
normally
used
with
cryptocurrencies i.e. currencies that use public-key
cryptography as security measure and to prevent
counterfeiting transactions. Blockchain can be seen
both as a technical and as an economic innovation [11].
As a technical innovation, it is a new version of
database transaction technology especially for
decentralized environments of limited or imperfect
trust. As an economic innovation it offers novel tools
to any problem domain where there exists a need for a
reliable record of transactions – a ledger - in a
decentralized environment where not all parties,
whether humans or machines can be fully trusted.

2.2. Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the initial distributed transaction system
(bitcoin protocol) and a coupled currency (bitcoin as an
unit of account). Bitcoin “infrastructure” consists of
network of users, who have a client software running
on their computer. Bitcoin was first suggested in 2008
and implemented as an open source project in 2009 by
a person - or a group - calling himself or themselves
Satoshi Nakamoto [12].
Initial application of blockchain technology is the
original public ledger of bitcoin, which has later
inspired other implementations called altchains. These
kinds of networks also provide trust-based services that
are not limited to currency transactions: Bitnation.co –
decentralized
“Non-Geographically
Contingent
Governance Service Aggregators”5 offering a “full
range of services traditionally done by governments”6
with blockchain as its core technology - even aims
ambitiously to become a future legislative entity.
The idea of the bitcoin system is that the entire
earlier transaction history is verified by solving a
cryptographic computation. This “work” – or
computation time is extremely difficult to fake. This
method is called “proof-of-work” (PoW). In a process
called mining, blocks are created in about 10 minutes
each, after which the solvers of the computation
challenges are rewarded currency.
Users of the system use the bitcoin protocol to send
and receive payments to “wallets”, which are
anonymous (however, see [13] on identifying IP
addresses). Bitcoin protocol verifies each transaction.
Bitcoin protocol development is an open source project
supported by the Bitcoin Foundation, and the
development efforts are supported by a global
community of developers and entrepreneurs [3].
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Lack of faith on established financial institutions,
largely fueled by the financial meltdown of 2008 [14]
has been established as one of the main drivers for
development and proliferation of Bitcoin [3]). Another
identified driver is the aim at frictionless payment
systems [13, 15].
One prevailing question is whether Bitcoin should
be understood primarily as a financial asset or as a
system of payments (see for example [16] for more
thorough discussion on their differences). If it is seen
primarily as a financial asset, then the key issue is its
financial performance and returns it provides as an
asset. If it considered mostly as a payment system, key
is then its scalability for very large transaction
volumes.
Brezo and Bringas [17] analyzed different risks
related to Bitcoin and found that systems such as
Bitcoin are quite vulnerable to speculation and
misinformation. It has been contemplated that that the
lack of coordination entity (e.g. central bank) is at the
same time a strength and a weakness of this kind of
decentralized payment and trust infrastructure, as there
is less inertia to try new ideas, but users’ trust on the
platform can rapidly erode, if for example forks occur
in the development, as is currently happening in the
case of Bitcoin7. In the area of open source research
[18], different meanings of forks have been
investigated, but forks usually refer to a situation
where the developer community disagrees on the
development roadmap (or other focal issues) and this
results in a situation where several different competing
versions of the code base are in use. In most open
source projects forks are seen both as a safeguard of
openness and as detrimental to the development efforts
if they dilute contributions.
Bitcoin continues to capture the interest of
academics, practitioners and the public, and the
uncertainties resulting from its decentralized nature as
well as wide misconceptions surrounding it render
Bitcoin an excellent target for academic enquiry.

2.3. Potential of Blockchain technology
Blockchain technology and the underlying
distributed database technologies are the key
technological enablers of recent developments in
distributed transaction and ledger systems.
Financial instruments, such as payments, trading
records and smart contracts can be built on blockchain
technology, which then prevents adverse behavior and
repercussions, such as double-spending, forgeries and
7
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false disputes [15]. Furthermore, the technology can be
used for legal and public records, such as titles, birth
certificates, voting or court records. It can also be used
for creation of “smart property” in which case
blockchain becomes an inventory, tracking and buysell mechanism for hard assets like diamonds or cars. It
can also be used for tracing the product creation for
socially responsible business. Blockchain can be
utilized as a transactional mechanism for “sharing
economy” services [19], as it naturally solves trusted
recording of large-scale peer-to-peer activities. The
importance of such a transactional mechanism
increases with the emerging “Programmable World”8
where an increasing amount of physical things become
programmable and get connected to the Internet.
While the technical community (including both
computer science scholars and practitioners) have
addressed and continue to address blockchain as a
technology, our knowledge on its application beyond
descriptive accounts and anecdotal evidence is quite
thin. Particularly the opportunities and risks from
business and societal (rather than technical)
perspectives are not well understood.

2.4. Payment systems and platforms
In the development of digital payments, trust has
remained a focal conundrum [20-22]. Mobile payment
literature has argued for the need for trusted service
manager (TSM) that handles authentication,
authorization and account settlement [23], especially in
the presence direct and indirect network effects [24].
Distributed transaction platforms are answering this
challenge by radical decentralization based on peer-topeer networks. These are called “decentralized digital
currencies” (Dccy) or “cryptocurrencies” and
decentralized consensus systems (DCS) [25]. The first
and
most
widely
recognized
decentralized
cryptocurrency Bitcoin is a premier example, but there
is a host of other alternative currencies (“altcoins"),
including Litecoin, Peercoin, and Namecoin.
IS studies on open platforms [26, 27] and openness
in general [28] are highly useful in understanding the
development of new payment platforms. Open
platforms literature focuses on boundary resources and
ways to increase third party participation to the design.
Openness research has discussed governance of open
source development communities [18]. Governance in
this context is seen as the means of achieving the
direction, control, and coordination of wholly or
partially autonomous individuals and organizations on
behalf of an OSS (open source software) development
project to which they jointly contribute [29]. Open
8
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source research has addressed governance in three
different ways: 1) different incentives for independent
developers to participate in open efforts [30, 31] 2) as
well as the efforts to provide support for the necessary
coordination activities [32], and 3) encourage building
a culture that welcomes open contributions [29]. Open
source communities that produce implementations of
blockchain technologies seem to invite actors not so
common in more traditional open source communities,
but many of the governance challenges seem similar.
Even though distributed payment platforms are still
a maturing technology, they are on the verge of
becoming more widely accepted. This is demonstrated
by, for example, the fact that in February 2016, Japan
was considering legal changes that would define
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to be treated as
currencies.9
While there are still a host of unresolved question
related to digital payments and payment platforms in
general – ranging from the trust issues to payment
ecosystems – the decentralized nature of blockchain
technology create a new set of so-far unaddressed
research challenges that emerge when different
platforms and services are designed, developed,
introduced and eventually used.

2.5. Research gap
Based on our review of the extant literature, we
conclude that there are clear research gaps in the state
of the art related to these decentralized systems
building on blockchain technology. There is an urgent
call for research on both theoretical and practical
perspectives on the blockchain technology.
Many critical issues are related to the inherently
decentralized nature of these payment systems and
platforms. For example, how can both trust and
anonymity be guaranteed in such a platform-mediated
network, and how can the risks be identified and
mitigated? Only a better understanding of these risks
and opportunities will lead to better, more trustworthy
and more efficient services for citizens, consumers, as
well as the range of organizations with interest in
development of blockchain technologies.
To understand the operation logic and ensuing
opportunities and risks of blockchain technology
services and platform, we propose focusing on
organizational, environmental and technology factors.
Organizational factors include the organization and
management of the focal service or the platform,
9
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including issues such as financial structure (the cost
structure and profit potential [33] of the service) and
the related pricing strategies, or in other words the
underlying business model [34, 35].
Market environment, in turn, includes the demand –
that is, the users - as well as the competition, in terms
of both the direct competitors offering similar services,
and the companies offering substitute services. With
technology factors we refer to the details of the ICT
used, with a special interest in the design issues related
to developing these systems.
Information Systems Science research builds on a
wide range of possible lines of enquiry and theories
adopted most often from the disciplines of marketing,
management and economics, but also others including
sociology and law. Thus, we will refrain from
formulating the research issues in the light of any
specific theory or approach, but rather provide areas
for further investigation and possible research
questions.

3. Research agenda
In essence, the distributed payment systems and
platforms and other service enabled by blockchain
technology can be conceptualized as service
innovations. These service innovations can be expected
to either improve services productivity or to develop
new service models [36]. A widely accepted definition
of service innovation states that “a service innovation
is a new service experience or service solution that
consists of one or several of the following dimensions:
new service concept, new customer interaction, new
value system/business partners, new revenue model,
new organizational or technological service delivery
system.” [37]. Hence, we can understand service
innovations as combination of technology innovation,
business model innovation, social-organizational
innovation and demand innovation with the objective
to improve existing service systems (incremental
innovation) or to create new value propositions
(offerings) or create new service systems (radical
innovation) [38]. Service innovations are, in general
and in financial industry in particular often technologybased: either the introduction of a new technology or a
different use of existing technology. Whether
decentralized digital currencies, such as bitcoin, are
viewed as new-to-the-market or service line extension;
or technology innovation or demand innovation; or
some other type of service innovation, depends on the
perspective adopted. Regardless of the perspective, the
opportunities as well as risks are distinctly different
from, for example, banks’ and legislators’ perspective
to those of individual consumers or merchants. We
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utilize concepts from service innovation literature [37,
38]; together with the conceptualization of
decentralized payments systems as platform-mediated
networks in two (or many) sided markets [39-42] in
drafting a research agenda.
We will next outline a research agenda divided into
three focus areas of 1) organizational issues; 2) issues
related to the competitive environment; and 3)
technology design issues. We will discuss several
salient themes within each of the focus areas, and
derive a set of research question for each theme,
highlighting the need to address both risks and
opportunities for citizens as consumers, as well as
different types of organizations with a stake on the
development or utilization of blockchain technologies.

3.1. Organizational issues
With blockchain technology, the most critical
organizational issues for the time being are related to
the digital payment platforms and in more detail, the
network effects these kinds of platforms are subject to.
Another set of organizational key questions can be
derived from the new business models enabled and
facilitated by blockchain technology.
Digital payment platforms. Due to the nature of
financial transactions, the maturation of the technology
and more wide spread use will raise new
organizational, legal and institutional issues. For
example, while the ledgers are assumed to keep full
histories and all the transactions are presumed “final”
when settled, the processes are not unproblematic. For
instance, there can be disputes over the finality of the
transactions, or technology glitches and transaction
delays can create a need for third parties and legal
settlement. Several questions for research remain:
•

What novel technical and legal issues are
related to blockchain technology service and
platform contracts, ledgers and transactions?

•

How do these new institutional arrangements
without central authority function? What are
the implications to the users, different
stakeholder organizations and societies in
large?

•

How open are these platforms for
contributions and participation? What
incentives are there for third party
developers?

Network effects. Success of platform-mediated
networks and services depends highly on the size of the
user network [43]. Network effects are those positive

or negative effects that one user’s actions have on
another user’s valuation of the network [44]. In other
words, the value of membership to one user is
positively affected by another user joining and
enlarging the network [45]. Decentralized payment
platforms operate in many-sided markets, where the
platform’s value to any given user depends also on the
number of users on the network’s other side(s), and the
value grows as the platform matches demand from
different sides [39, 40]. To put it simply, the primary
two sides related to payment platforms are the payers
(e.g. consumers) and the payees (e.g. merchants). Both
same-side effects (i.e., how valuable is the growth of
the network for the users in the same side of the
market) and the cross-side network effects (i.e., how
valuable is the growth of the network on the other side)
are highly relevant in the context of decentralized
payments.
In industries characterized by strong, positive
network effects, a single platform can rise to
dominance, locking out competing services [41].
Transaction and payment platforms are such that we
can assume that there will be geographic and market
differences that lead into a situation where there are
several different players, but at the same time this is a
volume business and together with the needed trust this
will lead into situation, where a few dominant players
will emerge and in many markets there will be only
one platform available. This winning platform will not
necessarily or very likely be owned or operated by a
single player (such as a bank or a technology provider).
Rather, the platform will be the de facto technical
standard, similarly to for example mobile
telecommunication, allowing for interoperability
between different service providers. It should be a key
research theme to try to understand how this will play
out in different markets.
Pricing strategy is a very interesting topic in this
area. In two- or many-sided networks, pricing is
complicated, as the platform providers have to choose
a price for each side, factoring in the impact of the
other side’s growth and willingness to pay [42]. The
platform incurs costs in serving both groups of users
and can collect revenue from each, although one side is
most often subsidized [39]. A key issue here is to
determine which side receives a discount. In credit card
industry, for example, the industry norm is to subsidize
consumers (even though not fully) and charge credit
card accepting merchants more. Thus, it seems
reasonable to expect that new entrants will compete on
prices and speed of transactions. The ability to compete
along these parameters will define the success and
even survival of many of the actors in the industry.
Host of research questions remain, including:
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•

Where are the networks effects on blockchain
technology based payment platforms derived
from and how strong are they?

•

How strong are the same-side and cross-side
network effects on different market sides,
including (at least) consumers and businesses
accepting new types of payments?

•

What are the risks related to market power?
What is the likelihood of a particular
cryptocurrency becoming the dominant one,
even to the extent of a monopoly?

•

What are the viable pricing strategies for
decentralized services building on blockchain
technology? Are they different from pricing
strategies of other platform-mediated services
in financial industry, and if so, how and why?

•

What are the possible viable strategies for the
incumbent companies such as banks and
telecommunications operators? Will they
disrupt or be disrupted?

New Business models. Decentralization, blockchain
technology and the underlying distributed database
technologies offer possibilities also for new business
models. For example, currency exchanges have
emerged as an important gatekeeper role as
clearinghouses taking care of conversion of
cryptocurrencies to more traditional currencies. The
risks of such operations have been known for long, but
became very noticeable when Mt. Gox, which handled
around 70% of Bitcoin traffic dramatically filed for
bankruptcy in 2014. To make matters worse, initially
Bitcoin worth of around $450 million was found stolen
from the bank in the process [46].
Moore and Christin [47] analyzed the defaults of
these exchanges finding that their popularity and
transaction volume reduce the risk of default (i.e.,
credit risk) [48]. Host of questions remain:
•

What kind of new business models
decentralization and blockchain technology
enable or facilitate? Who will be able to
develop and benefit from these new business
models, various incumbents or new players?

•

What are the sustainable business models for
the new intermediaries? How to provide
viable revenue stream to the company while
maintaining users’ trust of the intermediary?

•

What are the business and financial risks
related to currency exchanges and who bears
them? How can the risks be mitigated and
managed?

•

What happened to Mt. Gox and how can such
events be prevented in the future?

3.2.
Issues
Environment

Related

to

Competitive

Financial services industry consists of a large
number of long established incumbents, banks and
credit card companies being traditionally the strongest
players. Now, however, their dominance over payment
services is increasingly challenged by entrance of
various technology providers, both established (e.g.
telecom operators) and totally new ones (e.g. mobile
payment service providers, such as, iZettle10). It
remains to be seen, how the incumbents and the new
players will divide the market, and who will provide
the services that the consumers are willing to accept
and adopt. A closely related set of questions arise from
the changes in consumers’ payment behavior, driven
by the proliferation of new payment technologies and
systems.
Actors in the financial industry. New digital payment
systems are not introduced to fill a previously
nonexistent need, but instead in the heavily contested
banking service landscape. Earlier research has noted
that it is notoriously difficult to compete with the
established incumbents in banking and telecom sectors,
which are heavily protected by laws are regulations in
most countries and regions [8, 49]. Reuver et al. [49]
provide an interesting historical example of what could
happen in such an institutional environment: banks
viewed new payment systems as a way to reduce cash
payments, but at the same time to protect their existing
handling of consumer payments. Mobile operators on
the other hand wanted to generate further revenues by
using SIM cards for payer identification. The
conflicting goals directly affected the negotiations on
pricing, openness etc. of the platform strategy. Thus,
new digital payment platforms face an uphill battle in
the heavily regulated financial sector. This the
institutional arrangements can be studied at least from
the following viewpoints:

10
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•

Which actors will emerge as the key players
in the development of new payment systems
and services?

•

What will be the different roles of the
incumbents and the new entrants in the
changing financial services industry?

•

What are the characteristics of new payment
and trust systems that can radically alter the
economics of payments?

Consumers’ payment behavior. When examining the
use of different information systems or technologies,
IS research has traditionally focused on technology
acceptance and adoption by the users (see e.g. [50,
51]), in circumstances usually (ideally) involving large
paradigmatic shifts in use behavior. Can we understand
the adoption – or non-adoption, for that matter – of
new payment technologies with the help of earlier
tested technology acceptance models? If not, how the
adoption should be theorized and understood in this
context?
For consumers, trust and context issues related to
payments have been found to be of paramount
importance [52]. By and large, consumers are reluctant
and slow to change their payment behavior, but if the
context is such that they find the new payment systems
more convenient and/or cheaper than the old ones, the
change can be quite rapid [52]. Most of the early
adopters of Blockchain based cryptocurrencies have
been technology enthusiasts, as expected. When the
systems become more mainstream, the users need to be
able to trust that there will not be significant volatility
in the value of the currencies. Furthermore, the
probability of any large-scale disruptions in the
platform operations that can have instant negative
effects must be substantially decreased before large
scale adoption by the consumers is likely.
Also understanding the homing costs of different
decentralized payment systems is of great importance.
If we are to see wider proliferation of one or more new
cryptocurrencies, whether the consumers are likely to
prefer mono-homing, that is, become a user of only one
particular cryptocurrency, or are they more likely to
prefer multi-homing, that is, the ability to use various
payment methods is of great significance. This is
largely dependent on the costs of adopting and using
(and when necessary, terminating the use) of one or
multiple alternatives. While homing costs of
cryptocurrencies are relevant for the merchant side as
well, the question is more crucial for the consumers
with more limited resources.
Interestingly, earlier studies have found evidence of
the role of social influences in consumer behavior in

different contexts [53, 54]. Also, fashion and trends
have an effect on consumers’ buying behavior [55, 56].
Technology industry has seen its share of fashions and
fads, throughout the years: some have been more
persistent (e.g. social media, that was originally
branded as a trend to die out soon), while some have
disappeared before becoming more widely accepted
(e.g. WAP services on early mobile (or feature)
phones. Some interesting questions related to
consumers’ payment behavior remain:
•

How the diffusion and adoption of blockchain
technology based systems unfold among the
consumers in different markets?

•

What
technological
or
psychological
characteristics affect the use of blockchain
technologies and how?

•

What are the contextual issues that lead users
to change their established trust providers or
financial institutions?

•

What are the costs related to using one (or
more than one different) new payment
method?

•

What is the role of different social factors in
proliferation of decentralized payment
systems and cryptocurrencies?

•

What operational performance changes lead to
adoption of the new systems?

3.3. Technology Design Issues
Instead of focusing on the technical developments
of distributed transaction technology, we look at the
design decisions and issues and provide avenues for
building new service prototypes through design
research. As this is new technology that changes long
established patterns of user behavior in sensitive areas
- such as, changing ownership of goods and monetary
transactions - it is important to conduct trials in
different kinds of settings and with different
prototypes. This would naturally lead into using design
research in forms such as Action Design Research that
promote testing designs in real world settings and
adjusting the artifacts during their testing [57].
In a setting where the software platform has a clear
owner, boundary resources are the resources provided
by the platform owner to facilitate third-party
development efforts [26]. These efforts aim at inviting
additional contributions to the design and increased
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access to the platform. These resources also provide
means for the governance of contributions. More
research is needed on the role of boundary resources
for the different platforms which lack a clear owner or
have a set of different actors jockeying for the design
decisions, resources and governance power.
Possible research questions related to the
technology design issues are:
•

•
•

What are the possible new application areas
for blockchain technology based computing
platforms?
How are design decisions made in different
systems relying on blockchain technology?
What are the features of these systems that
enhance and/or decrease the trust of users
towards the economic or regulatory systems
that they implement?

4. Discussion
In this paper, we have outlined an initial research
agenda and a set of questions for information systems
research on blockchain technologies in payments. We
reviewed the relevant (but still scarce) extant literature
to identify and classify the challenges related to
blockchain technology based platforms and services,
with a particular focus on new decentralized payment
systems, and developed a research agenda to support
future research in this emergent area.
To this end, we have provided a host of possible
research questions related to different aspects of
blockchain technologies. Even though the list is
diverse, covering a large area of topics and domains,
we do not claim it includes all relevant questions. On
the contrary, we believe that many more are needed,
and these need to be addressed from a multitude of
perspectives, by researchers from different disciplines.
Nevertheless, we are confident that the research agenda
presented in this paper can serve as an inspirational
starting point into an area that is likely to be important
for research and for practice beyond our current
comprehension.
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